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Individuals who under-invest in education experience negative outcomes along most
measurable dimensions. Although such under-investment is common, it is not ad-
equately explained by existing economic theory. We disaggregate the canonical
educational investment decision into a series of incremental educational opportu-
nities, and thereby endogenously separate economic agents into high- and low-10
participation equilibria. We derive self-productivity in cognitive ability develop-
ment, and we identify the effects of specific noncognitive skills. Our results suggest
that early intervention should focus on children’s noncognitive skills, whilst later
intervention should not target disadvantaged individuals directly — it should focus
instead on specified aspects of their educational provision.15
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I. Introduction
Economic inequality poses a challenge to society. The prevailing level of inequality in
developed nations is often considered to be socially unfair, and its links with excess20
morbidity, mortality, and political unrest are well known (Graham 2007, Ezcurra &
Palacios 2016, Jetten et al. 2017). Whilst an extensive literature has established that
modern economic inequality is perpetuated through the educational under-investment of
disadvantaged children (Cunha et al. 2006, Conti, Heckman & Urzua 2010, Lavecchia,
Liu & Oreopoulos 2016), our knowledge as to why and how disadvantaged families under-25
invest in education remains limited. Without such knowledge the design of interventions
is reduced to trial, error, and educated guesswork.
Until recently, economic theory treated educational investment as a single-period deci-
sion over years-of-schooling. However, in 2007 Cunha & Heckman proposed an important
new model of educational production based upon multiple stages of childhood develop-30
ment. Their model incorporates self-productivity of multi-dimensional ability and dy-
namic complementarity between accumulated ability stocks and present investment, and
it shows that these features can explain six key empirical facts of childhood development.
The central implication of their model is that interventions to reduce economic inequality
should be weighted toward the first stage of childhood development. Existing economic35
theory is therefore able to inform the optimal timing of intervention, but it remains silent
as to the form that such intervention should take because educational production is still
treated as a black box.
In this paper we model the mechanism of educational production. We postulate that
educational investment should be founded on the incremental choices that parents and40
children make on a daily basis. At the earliest ages, such decisions include whether to:
talk to the child, play with the child, read with the child, and so forth. As the child
develops, she begins to take decisions such as whether to: engage in group activities,
attempt classwork tasks, and study for tests. We build a new model of human capital
development based upon these ‘nano-foundations’, and we use that model to extend45
existing economic theory in four important respects.
First, our model provides an explanation for the striking empirical anomaly of edu-
cational under-investment. In the US, for example, high school dropouts are 2.1 times
less likely to earn over $25,000 per annum, 2.4 times more likely to be incarcerated, 3.0
times more likely to have a child before the age of twenty, and 1.3 times less likely to50
report ‘good’ health outcomes1 — and yet around 30% of US children drop out of their
high school education (Messacar & Oreopoulos 2013). A large body of literature has
attempted to reconcile these facts, but it has fallen short of that goal because, for any
1These comparative statistics are derived from the General Social Survey; they are not causal es-
timates, but rather illustrate the extent of social inequality. A detailed derivation is provided in the
supplementary materials.
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high-level choice over years-of-schooling, the net benefit of completing high school is over-
whelmingly positive, even allowing for behavioural adjustments to an adolescent’s payoff55
function (see Section II). By contrast, the educational benefit of each incremental edu-
cational opportunity is small enough that behavioural factors, and agents’ noncognitive
ability to withstand them, can be decisive. We show that our nano-founded model en-
dogenously separates the population into divergent high- and low-participation pathways,
whereby an arbitrarily small change in initial conditions can precipitate a life-changing60
reduction in equilibrium investment.
Second, where previous models take self-productivity, dynamic complementarity, and
sensitivity to early investments as primitive assumptions, we derive them as a consequence
of our modeling approach. Since Cunha & Heckman (2007) it has been accepted that
these characteristics underpin the technology of skill formation, but this paper is the65
first to provide a theoretical explanation of how they might arise. As a consequence, our
theory shares the salient characteristics of the seminal framework proposed by Cunha &
Heckman (2007) when its implications are aggregated to the level of developmental stages.
We therefore provide a tangible theory of educational investment which can explain the
six key empirical facts of childhood development that those authors identify.270
Third, we are able to identify the effects of three specific aspects of noncognitive ability
on children’s educational investment. When participation decisions are considered in ag-
gregate, children and their families are implicitly assumed to possess perfect self-control,
perfect forward-planning, and perfect self-knowledge. Our analyses allow each of those
assumptions to be relaxed. We demonstrate that greater self-knowledge unambiguously75
increases participation, but that greater forward-planning increases participation only
for agents who also possess self-knowledge. These findings warn of potentially counter-
productive outcomes from interventions which focus on teaching young children to plan
ahead, without teaching them to anticipate their own future temptations. Where children
display bounded self-control they will persevere with educational activities if and only if80
they experience initial success or enjoyment. This characteristic could be harnessed by
parents or educators who wish to increase a child’s participation, but it also warns that
interventions wherein a child is not supported to achieve some early success could have
a negative net effect.
Fourth, our model provides a new and concrete interpretation of educational under-85
investment during childhood. Traditionally, educational investment is thought of as years-
of-schooling, which only becomes manifest at the school leaving age. However, our results
imply that incremental participation decisions taken during childhood represent a vital
form of educational investment, because later schooling outcomes arise as an equilibrium
2The first five of these facts describe the properties of the divergent developmental pathways that
are emerge from our analyses, together with the self-productivity and dynamic complementarity that
characterise those pathways; the sixth affirms the central importance of noncognitive skills.
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response to those early decisions.90
Taken together, our results contribute an explicit mechanism for the observed educa-
tional under-investment of disadvantaged children: i) at an early age, the child’s partici-
pation is essentially determined by the decision-making of her parents, ii) disadvantaged
parents are likely to be able to provide less frequent educational activities,3 and iii) the
frequency of early participation in incremental educational activities critically determines95
the child’s educational pathway.
Our findings therefore support the consensus view in the literature that early inter-
vention is vital if the persistence of economic inequality is to be reduced. However, they
challenge the prevailing assumption that such intervention should focus on raising the
cognitive ability of disadvantaged children. We show that if a disadvantaged child could100
learn the noncognitive skills of forward-planning and self-knowledge, she would be sub-
stantially more likely to participate in incremental educational opportunities thereafter.
Such an intervention could thereby materially increase the probability of her escaping a
low-participation equilibrium, whilst an intervention which exogenously increased cogni-
tive ability would be unlikely to overcome disadvantageous model parameters.105
Our results nevertheless demonstrate that if a child’s noncognitive skill deficit is not
addressed within a critical time-period, the low-participation pathway would become her
equilibrium strategy even with perfect forward-planning and self-knowledge. We therefore
conclude that an effective later intervention should target the child’s situation, rather
than the child herself. The child’s situation is that they face incremental educational110
investment decisions described by parameters which they cannot control. But because
those exogenous parameters represent tangible aspects of any educational task, we are
able to make specific pedagogical recommendations that would enable educators and
parents to manipulate those parameters and thereby increase equilibrium participation.
Although this conclusion represents a paradigm shift for some policy-makers, our results115
suggest that intervening with the situation rather than the child could meaningfully
reduce the persistence of economic inequality.
In addition to its practical implications, our model also yields an important moral im-
plication. At any cross-section, a child’s observable ability is endogenously co-determined
by the their initial ability endowment and by their sequence of educational participation120
decisions to date. Because current ability influences future participation, those inputs
not only interact inseparably within the educational production technology, but ex-post it
would be impossible to disentangle their relative contributions due to an initial-conditions
problem. However, children can influence neither their genetic endowment nor their early
3The literature suggests many potential reasons for this: disadvantaged parents may have reduced
levels of noncognitive skills (including self-control, self-knowledge, and forward-planning), reduced time
due to a higher incidence of single-parenthood and higher fertility rates, reduced capability due to
multi-dimensional poverty, reduced esteem of or knowledge of the educational process, credit constraints
impacting the provision of educational play materials, and so forth.
EDUCATION AS A PARTICIPATION GAME 5
educational participation. Thus, since apparent under-investment in adolescence could125
be an equilibrium response to early disadvantage, we must conclude that the victims of
poverty may not be wholly responsible for their ostensibly poor educational investment
decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the existing educational investment
literature, and finds that the observed extent of under-investment is not yet adequately130
explained. Section III then presents our model, whereafter Subsections IVA–D character-
ize its analytic solutions, and Subsections E–F illustrate those solutions numerically for
a robust set of functional form assumptions. Section V then discusses the implications of
our results, and Section VI concludes.
II. The Existing Literature135
Educational investment decisions determine many individual outcomes. A large body
of evidence suggests that the financial returns to education appreciably surpass market
rates of return (Cahuc, Zylberberg & Carcillo 2014), that those returns may themselves
be surpassed by the non-pecuniary benefits of education (Oreopoulos & Salvanes 2011),
and that the social returns to education are probably of comparable magnitude to those140
personal benefits (McMahon 2004). It is therefore an important objetive for economic
theory to be able to explain the observation that a substantial minority of individuals drop
out of education considerably before it would be optimal for them to do so (Oreopoulos
2007).
Most economic theories of educational investment are built upon the canonical invest-145
ment model of Becker (1962, 1964). That model yields the elegant and intuitive result
that individuals should optimally invest until the marginal cost of further education ex-
ceeds its marginal product. This implies that the apparent under-investment of many
disadvantaged children could be an optimal response, if they either: possess a particu-
larly low educational productivity, or experience a particularly high participation cost.150
We assess the evidence for each of these hypotheses in turn.
The first hypothesis lacks empirical support. It was shown as early as Griliches (1977)
that the returns to education for observationally less able children are at least as great
as those for their more able peers, and that conclusion is now supported by a large body
of IV literature in which the LATE for individuals affected by exogenous increases in155
compulsory schooling often exceeds OLS estimates of the average returns to schooling
(Harmon, Oosterbeek & Walker 2000). Thus it is not the case that those children who
invest the least in their education do so because of lower productivity.
The second hypothesis has now also been refuted empirically. For an economically
rational agent, educational participation costs arise due to credit constraints, however160
Carneiro & Heckman (2002) determine that such constraints are of minor importance in
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the developed world, and Jensen (2010) found that they affect only the poorest families
in the developing world. These results suggest that the apparent educational under-
investment of many disadvantaged individuals in the developed world does indeed rep-
resent a normatively suboptimal choice.4 The challenge is therefore to understand the165
mechanism behind that choice.
Several economic theories attempt to explain suboptimal educational participation.
One possible explanation is that disadvantaged children might under-invest because they
underestimate their true returns to education. There is evidence that this may be an
important factor in the Dominican Republic (Jensen 2010), but those authors believe170
that such ignorance is unlikely to be significant in the developed world, and Rouse (2004)
finds firm evidence in support of that belief. Nevertheless Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos
(2016) survey a large number of nudge-based interventions to find that some succeed in
increasing participation by expounding the benefits of post-compulsory eduction, which
suggests that incomplete knowledge regarding the returns to education may contribute175
toward explaining under-investment.
Perhaps the most promising avenue toward explaining educational under-investment
is the acknowledgement of behavioral aspects of decision-making. Lavecchia, Liu & Ore-
opoulos (2016) eloquently articulate the intuition that present-bias could lead to ed-
ucational under-investment, and studies such as Shoda, Mischel & Peake (1990) have180
provided convincing experimental corroboration of that hypothesis. Nevertheless, Ore-
opoulos (2007) estimates the parameters of a standard investment model which incorpo-
rates present-bias to find that an implausibly large degree of bias would be necessary to
completely explain observed under-investment.
A complementary approach could be to incorporate additional behavioral motivations185
into the model. For example, Wang & Yang (2003) and Ko¨szegi (2006) include a payoff
to self-worth within their agents’ objective function, which induces a psychic cost of
failure within educational participation decisions and therefore reduces participation.
Analogously, Akerlof & Kranton (2002) include a payoff to social identity, and thereby
suggest that poorly endowed agents might choose to reduce their educational effort in190
order to fit in with the ‘burnouts’. These approaches each provide useful insights, but
once again they seem unlikely to explain the magnitude of observed under-investment,
which Cunha & Heckman (2008) estimate to be equivalent to an unobserved cost in the
order of $500,000 for U.S. college attendance.
The model presented in Section III does predict severe under-investment in education195
by a subset of individuals. The model incorporates a combination of present-bias and
psychic payoffs to success and failure, but its main driving forces are a modest time-
4If this conclusion is correct then one implication is that many early-leavers of education should be
expected to later regret that decision. Bridgeland, Dilulio & Morison (2006) corroborate that implication,
by establishing that 74% of U.S. high school drop-outs later regret dropping out.
EDUCATION AS A PARTICIPATION GAME 7
consistent discount rate, and a derived self-productivity in cognitive ability. These at-
tributes are consequential because the canonical one-shot educational investment decision
is disaggregated into elemental participation decisions, each of which contributes only an200
incremental payoff in terms of educational development. Section ?? demonstrates that
such disaggregation remains consistent with the canonical investment criterion of Becker
(1962).
There is surprisingly little economic theory that examines more than a handful of pe-
riods of educational investment. Sjo¨gren & Sa¨llstro¨m (2004) and Filippin & Paccagnella205
(2012) both analyse the many-period case, but neither model incorporates dynamic skill-
development. Those papers focus instead on the implications of over- or under-optimism
regarding an agent’s fixed ability endowment, to reveal that over-optimism leads to
greater participation. Some of the most important insights in this area are therefore appli-
cations of more general results. For example, Thaler & Shefrin (1981) analyse the conflict210
between an agent’s ex-ante preferences and his extemporary desires, and O’Donoghue &
Rabin (1999) analyse the implications of present-bias, both for sophisticated agents who
anticipate it, and for na¨ıve agents who only experience it. This paper builds on each
of those analyses, to derive the implications of a simple many-period educational invest-
ment model, under three contrasting levels of sophistication. In doing so, it also extends215




Agents face a series of T educational participation decisions. Their (potentially mixed)220
strategy space is therefore given by S := {s1, s2, ..., sT}, where st is their chosen proba-
bility of participating in the period t opportunity.
Each individual decision is presented as an extensive form participation game in Figure
1. The decision utility payoffs relevant to educational participation are:
dt the present value of the human capital developed by participating in the task,225
ct the direct and opportunity cost of effortful task participation,
pst the psychic payoff to achieving success,
pft the psychic cost of failure,
where the subscript t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} denotes period-specific, or equivalently, task-specific
variation. We shall refer to the first two items as the material components of the payoff230
function, and the final two items as the psychic components. Since these payoffs are
formally defined up to affine transformation, we may normalize the payoff of task avoid-
ance to be 0, without loss of generality. It is then uncontentious to further assume that
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pst , p
f
t >0 ∀t — that is: success is pleasant, and failure unpleasant, ceteris paribus (see,
for example: Be´nabou & Tirole 2002, Wang & Yang 2003). Although we initially anal-235
yse the implications of the model for one representative agent, it will already be evident
that individual outcomes must be substantially determined by individual heterogeneity
in decision utilities. The implications of such individual heterogeneity are discussed in
Section V.
[Figure 1 about here.]240
As can be seen in Figure 1, the agent’s probability of achieving success at time t is
denoted by pit. pit is considered to be a draw from Πt, which is the agent’s probability
of success distribution across all possible tasks at time t. Πt will be determined by a
spectrum of individual and familial characteristics, but also by the human capital which
has been developed as a consequence of educational participation in periods τ < t. We245
therefore assume that Πt+1 stochastically dominates Πt if the agent attempted task t,
and that Πt+1 is stochastically dominated by Πt if the agent avoided task t. In this
paper we make the additional simplifying assumption that Πt(n) is uniquely determined
by the period, t, and the number of educational tasks thus far attempted, n.5 That
simplifying assumption yields the intuitive and useful lemma that E(Πt(n)) is a strictly250
increasing function of n, a formal proof of which appears in the appendix, as do proofs
of all subsequent propositions.
An agent’s probability of success distribution Πt characterizes their stock of cognitive
ability in period t. This paper provides a partial equilibrium model of human capital
development, in that it allows Πt to develop dynamically whilst noncognitive abilities,255
psychic payoffs, and participation costs are modelled as time-invariant traits. This ap-
proach allows us to expose the implications of our nano-founded theory whilst identifying
the effects of heterogeneity in those traits. Ongoing work extends the present theory to a
general equilibrium model in which noncognitive abilities evolve alongside cognitive abil-
ities, and it finds that those more realistic feedback mechanisms reinforce the dynamic260
implications of the time-invariant traits model.
We nevertheless allow dt(n) to vary by period t and by prior participation n. To see
why, define V (n) as the present value in period T +1 of having attained educational level
n by the end of compulsory schooling. This value will represent the sum of: expected
future remuneration, expected non-pecuniary benefits of education, and the opportunity265
value of whichever further and higher educational opportunities are accessible to an agent
of attainment level n. Without loss of generality, we normalize V (0) := 0, recognising
that in absolute terms V (0) will be affected by factors such as social security policy.
5This amounts to an assumption that educational tasks are perfect substitutes, which greatly improves
tractability but costs little in generality, since its relaxation would have an analogous effect to increasing
the magnitude of the psychic payoffs. In reality this assumption will be true to the extent that teachers
and parents are able to differentiate educational tasks to match the current needs of each child.
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Thus, under the quasi-hyperbolic discounting of Laibson (1997), we will have that:
dt(n) = βδ
T−t+1 [V (n+ 1)− V (n)] =: βδT−t+1 [V ′(n)] (1)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the agent’s per-period discount rate for future payoffs, where β ∈ [0, 1]270
parameterizes present-bias, and where we define V ′(n) := V (n+ 1)− V (n) to be the first
difference of V at n.6 Thus dt(n) represents the present value to the agent of increasing
her current education level by participating in the n+1th task.
Note that the above derivation of dt implicitly assumes the educational benefit of
task participation to be independent of whether success is achieved. This assumption275
contrasts with some existing economic models (e.g. Sjo¨gren & Sa¨llstro¨m 2004, Filippin
& Paccagnella 2012), however it is in line with the educational literature, where it is
recognized that we may typically learn at least as much from our mistakes as from flawless
task completion (see, for example: Black & Wiliam 1998). The contrasting assumption
that only success begets learning would meaningfully change the decision-making of naifs280
by introducing an incentive to front-load participation, but it would have little qualitative
effect on sophisticates who already experience such an incentive. We now formally define
these agent archetypes.
B. The Players and their Noncognitive skills
Three specific noncognitive skills constrain an agent’s equilibrium actions under the pro-285
posed model. In order to calculate the first best solution, an agent would need to posses
substantial forward planning ability, and perfect anticipation of her future period payoffs.
An agent who possesses such forward-planning and self-knowledge will be described as
sophisticated, following the terminology of O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999). We also follow
those authors in identifying the specific effects of limited self-knowledge by comparing290
the sophisticate’s solution to that of a na¨ıve agent. A Naif is considered to possess per-
fect forward-planning, but limited self-knowledge: they do not anticipate that psychic
payoffs and present-bias will continue to affect them in future periods. The naif therefore
provides an archetype of the most extreme version of the human tendency to discount
any visceral influences over our future behavior, as described by Loewenstein (1996).295
These archetypes are informative, because they bound the continuum of possible levels
of self-knowledge.
We similarly identify the effect of limited forward-planning ability by considering the
extreme case of a myopic agent. The myope does not consider the existence of any future
educational opportunities: he merely maximises his expected utility for each stage game300
in isolation. The myope is therefore akin to the myopic ‘doer’ of Thaler & Shefrin (1981),
6Analogously, we define V ′′(n) := V ′(n+ 1)− V ′(n) to be the second difference of V at n.
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save that he is assumed to internalise the (arguably future) educational benefit of task
participation dt. Nevertheless, under the as if interpretation of Expected Utility Theory,
he need not be consciously aware of this or any other aspect of the game structure. The
Noncognitive skill levels of each agent archetype are summarized in Table 1.305
[Table 1 about here.]
To identify the effect of limited self-control, we analyse the behavior of each archetype
both with and without commitment. An agent exhibits perfect self-control when she
commits to each period’s strategy st before any information is received as to that period’s
realized probability of success pit. The opposite extreme is modelled by allowing the agent310
to costlessly ‘try’ each educational task to learn their realized probability of success pit,
without necessarily seeing that task through to completion.7 In reality, it is unlikely that
the child’s signal of pit would be perfect, however we model this extreme case in order
to provide an upper bound on the effect of limited self-control. Similarly, we assume
throughout that all agents have perfect information regarding their probability of success315
distribution Πt, in order to isolate the unique predictions of our model.
8
Throughout our analyses we will derive Bayesian Nash Equilibria of the participation
supergame, which O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999) refer to as ‘perception-perfect’ equilibria.
This is a strong solution concept, since it allows agents to choose their entire strategy S
without restriction. It is therefore unsurprising that, with probability 1, there is a unique320
equilibrium for any given set of parameters, sophistication assumptions, and commitment
constraints (see Proposition 3). A weaker solution concept which requires only that each
period’s strategy st should be a best response, holding all other participation decisions s−t
constant, would generally produce two markedly different weak equilibria, representing
high- and low-participation pathways respectively. Propositions 2 and 5 expose the fact325
that an arbitrarily fine change in initial conditions could determine which of these two
markedly different pathways will be the unique (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium outcome.
IV. Analyses
The objectives of these analyses are threefold. First, we wish to establish the implications
of our model for the aggregate technology of skill formation. This is undertaken in330
7This concept could be termed periodwise commitment. An alternative concept of ex-ante commit-
ment, under which an agent must commit to her entire strategy in period 0, is unjustifiable in this
context. For completeness a discussion of ex-ante commitment is included in the supplementary ma-
terials – in summary: it is meaningless for the myope, it allows the naif to reproduce the normatively
optimal solution, and it is almost identical to periodwise commitment for the sophisticate. The last result
is interesting, because for the sophisticate the two concepts differ precisely by the effect of present-bias,
and so we establish that present-bias is qualitatively unimportant in our example.
8Relaxing these assumptions to allow unbiased noise would merely increase the stochastic element of
non-commitment explored in Section F; allowing bias in the signal would replicate the main result of
Filippin & Paccagnella (2012) that under- (rsp. over-) optimism regarding one’s ability reduces (increases)
educational participation.
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Subsection A. Second, we wish to establish the implied pattern of participation for each
agent archetype. By comparing these, we will be able to establish our third objective of
identifying the participation effect of each noncognitive skill. Subsections B–D address
these objectives analytically, and Subsections E–F illustrate our results numerically.
A. The Technology of Skill Production335
We begin by characterizing st, the equilibrium strategy of the stage game depicted in
Figure 1. Let us denote by w(pit,Πt) the general form of an agent’s believed probability
of success in period t. The Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the stage game is therefore a












dt − c− pf + w(pit,Πt)(ps + pf )
]
(2)
Proposition 1 characterizes such a strategy:
Proposition 1
1. Any Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of the stage game (Figure 1) is, with prob-
ability 1, a pure strategy.
2. Any agent faced with the stage game will participate whenever dt > c + p
f ; avoid340
the task whenever dt + p
s < c; and otherwise participate if and almost only if her
believed probability of success exceeds (c+ pf − dt)/(ps + pf ).
The first of these results formalizes the notion that the nano-founded framework dis-
aggregates educational investment into a series of binary decisions. The second result
establishes the intuition that an agent will optimally participate in any incremental op-345
portunity if and only if her probability of success is sufficiently high. That intuition forms
the basis of the self-productivity of cognitive ability which generates many of the model’s
implications. Proposition 2 exposes the source of that self-productivity:
Proposition 2 In any period t, and for an agent who has no information concerning
the realization pit:350
The psychic component of the stage-game payoff function, −pf +w(Πt)(ps + pf ) exhibits
increasing returns to previous participation.
The implications of an increasing-returns production technology are well-known: for ex-
ample Arthur (1989) demonstrates that this characteristic can lead to multiple equilibria,
path-dependence, and inefficient outcomes. Thus the participation decision becomes, in355
general, a complex dynamic problem. That problem is made more tractable by the fact
that the results of Proposition 1 generalize to the case of forward-looking agents, as proven
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in Proposition 3. Proposition 3 also proves the useful result that, absent any signal of pit,
any utility-maximising agent would set w(Πt) = E(Πt). The intuition behind the latter
result is that an agent who wishes to maximize her expected utility should, in practice,360
adopt the best available estimate of its conditional realization.
Proposition 3 In the finitely repeated game with T periods:
1. Any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy S ∈ {0, 1}T with probability 1.
2. In any period t, an agent will participate if and almost only if her believed probability
of success exceeds some determinate critical value.365
3. In any period t, an agent who has no information concerning the realization pit
should optimally set w(Πt) = E(Πt).
Together, these results establish that self-productivity, dynamic complementarity, and
sensitivity to early investments are endogenously produced by our model. In any period
t an agent is more likely to participate in the present educational opportunity if their370
stock of (cognitive) ability Πt is greater (Propositions 3.2; 3.3). Thus, since educational
opportunities are precisely those situations which develop ability, we have that ability is
self-productive.
To see that there is dynamic complementarity between a child’s accumulated ability
stock and present period external investment, consider the child’s period t participation375
decision. If the child’s ability exceeds the participation threshold given by Proposition
3.2 then no intervention is necessary. If, however, the child has an ability deficit rela-
tive to that participation threshold, then they would only participate if some external
investment were to intervene to improve their expected participation payoff. Exemplar
interventions might therefore aim to support the child’s probability of success, to reduce380
her participation cost, or to reduce her psychic cost of failure. An intervention would be
successful if and only if it closes the gap between expected participation costs and payoffs,
and that gap is increasing in the size of the child’s ability deficit. Thus the chance of
any given level of external investment having a positive effect is increasing in the child’s
current cognitive ability. A corollary to this conclusion is that the probability of present385
period external investment having a positive effect is also an increasing function of prior
investment.
Proposition 2 illuminates the optimal timing of any external investment. Consider a
child who would require continuous participation from periods 1 to n in order to develop
her cognitive ability to the self-sustaining participation threshold given by Proposition390
3.2. Then that child would not participate in the absence of external investment, and
so the contrapositive of Proposition 2 implies that a later intervention would have to
overcome a greater ability deficit. Thus not only would providing n periods of delayed
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participation be more costly than the corresponding immediate intervention, but it may
also fail to boost the child to the self-sustaining participation threshold. Moreover, if395
ever that threshold were reached, the child would still achieve a lower final education
level on account of the missed opportunities in her early life. Intervention is therefore
most effective if received at the earliest possible age; hence period 1 of our model is a
sensitive period in the sense of Cunha & Heckman (2007).
B. The Myopic Solution400
The myope has minimal forward planning ability. His equilibrium strategy S is therefore
composed of the sequence {s∗1, s∗2, ...s∗T} of actions which each maximise (2), the expected
utility of each successive stage game. This strategy is characterised by Propositions 4
and 5:
Proposition 4 For V ′(n) > 0, β, δ ∈ [0, 1], and with commitment:405
A myope will maximally postpone all participation whenever educational opportunities are
sufficiently incremental, specifically whenever
(ps + pf )
[
E(Πt+1(n+1))− EΠt(n)
] ≥ βδT−t[δV ′(n)− V ′(n+1)] ∀n, t : n < t. (3)
Proposition 5 For β, δ ∈ (0, 1), V ′(n) ≥ 0, V (T ) finite, E(Π1) = 12 , and K an
arbitrarily large integer; with commitment and as T →∞:
Myopes will participate in all of the first K periods if ps − pf > 2c, else they will avoid410
participation in all of the first K periods.
Proposition 3 implies that, in general, there are 2T possible equilibrium strategies,
however if the condition of Proposition 4 is satisfied, a myopic agent would adopt one of
the T + 1 strategies in which his participation is maximally postponed. The conditions
of Proposition 4 will often be satisfied. V ′(n) > 0 is a tautology in that it requires415
educational activities to provide some educational benefit; and β, δ ∈ [0, 1] holds by the
construction of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. For the final condition it would suffice for
the marginal product of educational activities to diminish by at most the discount rate,
since then
[
δV ′(n) − V ′(n+1)] ≤ 0, but, since the left hand side of condition (3) is
positive, it will in any case be satisfied during a child’s early years since then βδT−t << 1.420
The conditions of Proposition 5 model the situation faced by a young child who per-
ceives the end of compulsory schooling to be imponderably distant. Its result supports the
thesis of Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos (2016) that the participation decision of a young
child will be dominated by her present-period payoffs, and it further demonstrates that
those present-period payoffs exhibit a profound path dependence, in that an arbitrarily425
small change in initial conditions could lead to a diametric reversal of outcome. Together
with Proposition 4, this conclusion suggests that the equilibrium strategies of a myope
can be meaningfully dichotomized into high- and low-participation equilibria, where the
14 Lancaster University Working Paper
former is characterized by full participation, and where the latter is characterized by a
substantial period of non-participation, followed by a belated period of full participa-430
tion as the consequences of underachievement loom large towards the end of compulsory
schooling.
C. The Na¨ıve Solution
The naif possesses perfect forward planning ability, but minimal self-awareness. Her
equilibrium strategy is therefore generated by a family of T utility maximization problems,
each of which maximizes the discounted sum of the remaining stage-game utilities from
the perspective of one particular period τ ≤ T . These T objective functions each take
the form of (4), where a strategy S = {st}Tt=1 is considered to include all those decisions








































In general, the family of expressions {4} represents a complex dynamic problem because of
the endogeneity of Πt. One way to proceed would be to adopt the normative assumption of435
economic rationality. In the absence of behavioral motivations, that is when ps ≡ pf ≡ 0
and β ≡ 1, Lemma 1 shows that our model reduces in aggregation to the canonical
investment criterion of Becker (1962): normatively optimal participation should continue
until its marginal product no longer exceeds its marginal cost. The present approach
therefore provides a nano-foundation for that canonical investment criterion.440
Lemma 1 For V ′(n) > 0, V ′′(n) ≤ 0,9 δ ∈ (0, 1), and either with or without commit-
ment:




[V (n∗)− V (n∗ − 1)] ≥ c > δn∗+1 [V (n∗ + 1)− V (n∗)]
445 and where we define V (−1) := −∞, and V (T + 1) := V (T ).
9This standard concavity condition ensures that the normative solution is unique. It is highly plausi-
ble, since it states that educational attainment yields a diminishing marginal product. Note that, where
behavioral payoffs are non-zero, the result of Proposition 2 demonstrates that our educational production
technology could exhibit increasing returns to prior participation, even when educational attainment per
se has a diminishing marginal product.
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An important application of this Lemma is in the characterization of the naif’s equi-
librium strategy. Since the naif lacks self-knowledge, they believe that in future they will
act normatively, that is they set ps ≡ pf ≡ 0 and β ≡ 1 for all future periods. Thus the
endogeneity of Πt in {4} is irrelevant for them also. The equilibrium strategy for a naif450
is therefore reminiscent of that of the myope:
Proposition 6
1. Proposition 5 also holds for na¨ıve agents.
2. For V ′(n) > 0, β, δ ∈ (0, 1), E(Π1) = 12 , ps = pf , and with commitment:
A naif will delay participation until weakly beyond the normatively optimal point.455
3. For V ′(n) > 0, V ′′(n) < 0,V ′′(n) ≤ 0, β, δ ∈ (0, 1), and either with or without
commitment:
In the final period, participation for a naif is just as likely as for a myope, but
theretofore participation is strictly less likely for a naif than for a myope.10
The first two results imply that the equilibrium strategies of a naif are dichotomised460
into high- and low-participation pathways in a similar way to those of the myope. The
second and third results determine that the combination of perfect forward-planning with
minimal self-knowledge results in a level of participation that is generally below both the
normatively optimal level, and the level of participation achieved by the myope; even
though the latter possesses neither self-knowledge nor forward-planning. Thus, in the465
absence of self-knowledge, an intervention which teaches children to plan ahead is likely
to prove counter-productive.
D. The Sophisticated Solution
The sophisticate possesses both perfect forward-planning and complete self-knowledge.
She must therefore solve the full periodwise maximization problem {4} by internalizing470
the endogeneity of Πt. This makes her utility maximization problem considerably more
complex than that of either the myope or the naif. In particular, the sophisticate needs
to know (or assume) the functional forms and relative sizes of each constituent part of
her payoff function in order to calculate the optimal trade-off between skill accumulation
and potentially costly participation. Her behavior can therefore only be characterized475
relatively loosely without such assumptions.
Proposition 7
10Throughout this paper we intend both possible interpretations of the phrase ‘strictly less likely’:
Firstly the set of parameter values for which the naif would participate in any given period is strictly
smaller than that for the myope, and secondly the set of realized abilities for which the naif would
participate (without commitment) is strictly smaller than that for the myope.
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1. Under commitment, a sophisticate who does not discount future payoffs, that is for
whom β=δ=1, would front-load her participation to the maximum possible extent.
2. In the contrasting commitment case where discounting is relatively substantial and480
participation costs are relatively large, specifically whenever (1 − βδ) c+pf
ps+pf
≥ 1,
a sophisticate’s participation would always be postponed to the maximum possible
extent.
3. For V ′(n) > 0 and under commitment: If ever
[
E(Πt)(p
s + pf )− c− pf] ≥ 0, then
a sophisticate would participate in period t and all subsequent periods.485
4. In the final period, participation for a sophisticate is just as likely as for a naif,
but theretofore participation is strictly more likely for a sophisticate than for a naif
(either with or without commitment).
Proposition 6.2 showed that, for the naif, the effects of both psychic payoffs and of
present-bias were to unambiguously reduce participation. For a sophisticate considering490
whether to commence participation, those behavioral components still unambiguously
reduce her present-period payoff, but the net participation effect of that reduction is un-
certain. This is because a sophisticate also internalizes her reduced future participation
payoff, and so in some circumstances it may be optimal for her to overcompensate for
it. Ceteris paribus, Proposition 7.1 shows that the sophisticate’s psychic payoff com-495
ponent would favour the front-loading of any exogenously required participation. Thus
a sophisticate’s participation pattern will emerge as the net effect of a conflict between
the front-loading influence of those psychic payoffs and the postponing influence of inter-
temporal discounting (Proposition 7.2). The most fortuitous resolution of that conflict
occurs if the sophisticate were able to ensure that the net effect of both costs and psychic500
payoffs could become positive in the reasonably near future — since in that case her
equilibrium strategy could well be to participate fully in all educational opportunities
(Proposition 7.3).
Proposition 7.4 establishes that the sophisticate’s perfect self-knowledge unambigu-
ously increases her participation, whether by moderating the negative effects of ps, pf and505
β, or by reversing them to attain a high-participation equilibrium. Proposition 6, on the
other hand, shows that forward-planning without self-knowledge leads to procrastination:
the naif always believes that she will act optimally next period, and so she recursively de-
lays participation to avoid negative behavioral payoffs in the present period. These twin
results extend the main findings of O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999) to a situation where510
participation is optional and has dynamic consequences.
The next two subsections explore the above results by quantifying the participation
of myopes, naifs, and sophisticates, under two representative model specifications.
EDUCATION AS A PARTICIPATION GAME 17
E. A Quantitative Illustration of the Results
We now provide a numerical illustration of our results numerically. Although we nec-515
essarily sacrifice generality to do this, the supplementary materials demonstrate that
the findings presented here are remarkably robust to a comprehensive set of alternative
specifications. Table 2 details our preferred specification.
[Table 2 about here.]
The specification detailed in Table 2 is intended to model ‘reality’ as faithfully as520
possible. Its key features include: V ′ > 0; V ′′ < 0; Beta-distributed ability which is
bell-shaped on the support of (0, 1) and updates intuitively with diminishing returns
and cross-returns to participation; T = 10, 000 periods which represent approximately
four participation decisions per day for twelve years of compulsory schooling; δ = 0.999
which represents an annualized discount rate of 0.43 on that time scale, and a maximum525
schooling benefit V (T ) which is approximately five times greater than the total material
cost c×T of full educational participation. The fact that V (T ) >> c×T reflects the
common empirical finding that the net benefit of compulsory education far outweighs its
cost. A full rationale for this preferred specification is provided in the supplementary
material.530
The equilibrium actions for myopes and for naifs under commitment are explained by
Figure 2. Figure 2 evaluates the respective marginal developmental payoffs dmyopet and
dnaift for commencing participation in each period t, in present-period ‘money’, and given
the condition that participation is maximally postponed. Propositions 4 and 6 establish
that this condition accurately determines the points at which both myopes and naifs will535
optimally commence their participation. dmyopet exceeds d
naif
t because education yields
a diminishing marginal product, and so the naif’s na¨ıve belief that they will participate
for the final n∗ periods reduces her perceived payoff to present participation.
Each agent archetype will participate once her dt exceeds the solid black line that
represents their total cost c+ pf − E(Πt)(ps+pf ). That total cost is steadily increasing540
because it is calculated given the result of Proposition 5 that myopes and naifs do not
participate in the initial periods, for any reasonably balanced psychic payoffs. We can
therefore see that, for ps=pf =10 the myope would participate for the final 1,508 periods
and the naif for the final 750 periods, whilst for ps=pf =1, the myope would participate
for the final 3,177 periods and the naif for the final 1,583 periods. Thus the unique effect545
of perfect forward-planning is to approximately halve participation for agents who do not
also possess self-knowledge.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 therefore suggests that a child who is either myopic or na¨ıve would, without
external motivation, participate in only around 8-32% of educational activities. It is550
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interesting to contrast such a child’s extemporal preference with her ex-post preference.
The latter is for full participation, since ex-post the benefits of education are enjoyed at
the expense of only sunk costs. This discrepancy could explain why high school drop-
outs commonly regret dropping out (see, for example: Bridgeland, Dilulio & Morison
2006). It is also possible to objectively adjudicate between these conflicting preferences555
using our numerical illustration. We find that the unweighed expected utility sum for
full participation exceeds that of even n∗, the normatively efficient low-participation
equilibrium, whenever psychic payoffs are non-negligible; specifically whenever pf =ps>
0.1085. This result supports the consensus view in the literature that a high level of
educational investment is optimal.560
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium strategy of the sophisticate for all possible situations.
Possible situations are the complete set of Period × Prior Participation pairs at which
a sophisticate could exogenously be placed, and the equilibrium participation decision
for each of those cells can be calculated by reverse induction. Educational development
pathways would therefore be represented in Figure 3 by a path which starts at t=1, n=0,565
and traverses to t=10, 001 by travelling through 10,000 line segments, each of which would
head due East in the case of non-participation, or North-East in the case of participation
in that period. Clearly it is impossible for an agents’ prior participation to exceed t−1
in any period t. Thus we can see that for psychic payoffs ps = pf = 10 the sophisticate
would participate in period 1, and in all periods thereafter, but if ps = pf = 1 she would570
only participate for the final 1,622 periods. These results illustrate Proposition 7 by
showing that self-knowledge either mitigates the postponing influence of psychic payoffs
and present-bias, or reverses it entirely.
[Figure 3 about here.]
To see why a sophisticate would attain a high-participation pathway only if her psychic575
payoffs are sufficiently large, consider again Figure 2. The sophisticate experiences the
same payoffs as the myope in any given period, and so her period 0 expected utility
under full participation is given by the integral of dmyopet −
∑
cost|attempt over all periods,
weighted by each period’s cumulative discount factor. In Panel 2A this integral is initially
negative, but soon becomes substantially positive, whereas in Panel 2B this integral580
remains negative for many periods. The sophisticate has the foresight to pay an initial
cost, provided that it is smaller than the expected future benefits of attaining the high-
participation pathway. By contrast, neither the myope nor the naif would pay that
initial cost, because neither would anticipate the positive future psychic payoffs that the
high-participation pathway could provide.585
Figure 3 shows clearly the threshold between high- and low-participation pathways
for ps = pf = 10. In this case, if a sophisticate were to be exogenously placed11 at
11The exogenous situations described here could be produced by any of: missed early-years devel-
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period 509 with no prior participation, then her future participation would follow a low-
participation equilibrium pathway in which she participates for only the final 800 periods.
Contrastingly, if the same sophisticate were to exogenously arrive at period 508, she590
would fully participate throughout the remaining 9,493 periods. This illustrates the
results of Propositions 2 and 5, in that there is a clear bifurcation between high- and
low-participation pathways for a child who possesses both forward-planning and self-
knowledge.
This subsection has illustrated that agents’ developmental pathways under commit-595
ment can be broadly dichotomized into either high- or low-participation equilibria. Of
these, the former corresponds to the anecdote of a ‘good pupil’ who always tries her best,
and the latter corresponds to the anecdote of a pupil who essentially gives up on her
education due to early disadvantage, before putting in some effort as the consequences
of not doing so become apparent towards the end of compulsory schooling. We have600
seen that, for a range of reasonable psychic payoffs, agents who lack either self-knowledge
or forward-planning are likely to become trapped into a low-participation equilibrium,
unless some external intervention is provided during their early childhood. Where a child
does posses those noncognitive skills, their equilibrium pathway will be determined by the
interaction between her ability level and the exogenous (to her) parameters of the model.605
Subsection VA discusses the ways in which interventions could be designed to improve
the child’s participation likelihood given a set of exogenous parameters, and Subsection
VB discusses the ways in which educators and parents could manipulate those exogenous
parameters to create a more supportive environment for any given child.
F. The Quantitative Effect of Limited Self-Control610
This subsection explores the quantitative implications of limited self-control, for the spec-
ification listed in Table 2, and with the intermediate psychic payoffs ps = pf = 5. Figure
4 shows, for each agent archetype and for every possible situation, the probability ρ that
their realized ability pit will be high enough to induce participation. Since equilibrium
participation under commitment will occur whenever ρ > 0.5,12 we can also read agents’615
commitment solutions directly from Figure 4 as a dichotomization around ρ > 0.5. Thus
we can see that the qualitative effect of limited self-control is to introduce stochastic
variation around the solution under perfect self-control.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The most striking feature of Figure 4 is the similarity between the equilibrium strate-620
gies of sophisticates, naifs, and myopes. The broad appearance of each Subfigure reflects
opment opportunities, low initial ability, or less conducive initial parameter values. Moreover, these
‘possible pasts’ would be observationally equivalent for a cross-sectional empiricist.
12This holds because Proposition 3 demonstrates that, at equilibrium: w(Πt)=E(Πt).
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the divergence between high- and low-participation equilibria, and their commonality
reflects the fact that the equilibria of each agent archetype are characterized by such a
divergence.
Low-participation pathways arise because each Subfigure has a large area of very low625
participation likelihood. If ever an agent enters that region of low prior participation,
their equilibrium response would be to follow an almost horizontal (zero-participation)
path until they reach the small triangular region of high-participation likelihood towards
the end of their compulsory schooling. High-participation pathways arise because each
Subfigure has a large area of very high participation likelihood. If ever an agent enters630
that region of high prior participation, their equilibrium response would be to follow an
almost diagonal (full-participation) path for the remainder of their educational journey.
Thus we can conclude that low-participation equilibria are possible for individuals of any
noncognitive skill level, given sufficiently disadvantageous initial conditions, but also that
high-participation equilibria are possible for individuals of any noncognitive skill level,635
given sufficient social advantage.
Closer inspection of Figure 4 reveals a critical difference between the equilibrium
actions of sophisticates and those of either myopes or naifs. In the earliest periods of
the model, the participation likelihood of sophisticates is very high (in fact their initial
participation probability is 99.5%), whereas the initial participation likelihood of the other640
agent archetypes is very low (around 33%, which means that the conjunctive probability of
their participating in at least three-quarters of the first twenty periods is less than 0.1%).
Noncognitive skills therefore have a profound effect on a child’s educational outcomes.
In the absence of either forward-planning or self-knowledge it is highly unlikely that any
child would attain the self-sustaining ability threshold of the high-participation pathway.645
Figure 4 also illustrates many of our other analytic results. For example, we can see
that the region of postponed participation is reduced when an agent learns to plan ahead
without learning self-knowledge. We can also observe that the equilibrium quantity of
postponed participation is decreasing in an agent’s prior educational level; this will be
the case whenever educational attainment has a diminishing marginal product. Several650
more subtle implications from Figure 7 are discussed in the supplementary material.
In order to better understand the participation patterns that emerge from Figure
4, we now simulate the evolution of 9 myopes’ realized ability draws across time. The
parametric assumptions are again those of Table 2 with pf =ps=5, but here c=0 so that
the agents initial conditions lie close to the threshold between high- and low-participation.655
Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Ex-ante, all of the myopes described by Figure 5 are identical. Each has initial ex-
pected ability E(Π0) =
1
2
, and quite a wide dispersion of initial realized ability. As these
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agents progress through their compulsory education however, their Beta-parameterized660
ability distributions become much more precise, and develop towards probable success or
probable failure according to their individual participation histories. Without commit-
ment, a myope will participate if and only if his realized success probability exceeds the
critical value derived in proposition 1. That critical value is shown in Figure 5 as a narrow
black line, which begins at approximately 1
2
in all cases, since in period 0 dt is negligible665
due to discounting, and since balanced psychic payoffs ps=pf are assumed. The critical
value then changes little for agents who frequently participate, due to the assumption of
diminishing returns to education, however, for agents who stop participating, the critical
value becomes lower as the period T +1 consequences of (non)participation become more
immediate. The bar across the top of each panel of Figure 5 is shaded black with a670
density that reflects the realized local participation probability.
Figure 5 shows that, for these parametric assumptions, around half of those individu-
als who do not plan ahead (1, 2, 4, 6, and 8) experience sufficient early success to obtain
a development pathway characterized by mutually-reinforcing increases in ability and
participation. By contrast, individuals 3, 5, 7, and 9 experience a slightly poorer draw of675
initial realized abilities, which precipitates a mutually-reinforcing decline in ability and
participation. However, we can also see that those individuals with the most marked
decline in ability are the most likely to increase their effort as the consequences of their
present low attainment level gain immediacy towards the end of their compulsory educa-
tion. Further analyses have demonstrated that these few simulated vignettes appear to680
be representative of population outcomes under the current parametric assumptions. In
particular, Figure 6 demonstrates that simulated educational investment outcomes are
polarized into either high- or low-participation pathways.
Figure 6 also investigates the effect of altering the current parametric assumptions.
Panel 6A shows that, outside of a narrow window around c= 0, participation patterns685
of myopes without commitment vary little from the deterministic outcomes which would
be attained with commitment. This is because, for balanced psychic payoffs ps = pf ,
the first few periods’ utility maximization problems are dominated in expectation by
c, and so an improbably fortunate or unfortunate series of realized ability draws would
be needed to overcome that influence. The gray dots in Figure 6A represent simulated690
total participation outcomes for 200 myopes for each c value, and so it can be seen that,
outside of the window c ∈ [−0.1, 0.1] there is very little chance that any myope will
escape the influence of their participation cost. Thus, with c=1, essentially all vignettes
would resemble that of Panel 5.5, save that the critical ability level would be transposed
vertically upward, wherefore the decline in ability through time would be even more695
marked.
[Figure 6 about here.]
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The black diamonds of Panel 6A show the equilibrium outcomes for a myope under
commitment. It can be seen that, with commitment, the sign of c generates a stark
bifurcation between a complete participation pathway, and a low participation pathway700
wherein participation would be zero until the final ≈20% of periods. This bifurcation
illustrates the predictions of Propositions 1 and 5. We can also understand how variation
around those two pathways would arise without commitment. A stochastic reduction
from full participation would arise because some initial ability draws would be below
expectations, whilst a stochastic increase from low participation would arise because some705
later ability draws would exceed expectations. Both of these phenomena are exemplified
in Figure 5.
Panel 6B shows the effects of variation in the magnitude of the psychic payoffs, for
the reasonable participation cost c= 1. Since, in expectation, initial participation is not
optimal for any moderately positive c, participation under periodwise commitment oc-710
curs entirely in the final periods of compulsory education. Thus, as the psychic payoffs
increase, that participation becomes further delayed due to the negative expected influ-
ence of pf following many periods of task avoidance. A more interesting dynamic is seen
for very large psychic payoffs. Here, as previously, it becomes increasingly likely that
some unexpectedly high realized abilities in early periods could overcome the negative715
influence of c. However the qualitative importance of this effect remains negligible: in
additional analyses, all of 10,000 simulated individuals remained on a low-participation
pathway with c=1 and p=20.
This subsection has therefore established that imperfect self-control induces stochastic
variation around the familiar high- and low-participation pathways. Although the present720
simulations suggest that the boundary region wherein an agent’s level of self control
could affect their qualitative pathway may be relatively narrow, it could nevertheless
have important implications for pedagogy and for intervention design. Any educational
task, whether provided by a parent, an educator, or an intervention, would successfully
engage a child who lacks self-control if and only if she were able to achieve success in its725
initial stages.
V. Discussion with Implications for Policy and Practice
A. Implications for Intervention Design
The previous section has established that, under the proposed model, educational out-
comes are dichotomized into high- or low-participation pathways. Of these, the high-730
participation pathway is always optimal from the point of view of society, and from the
point of view of the child who ex-post enjoys the benefits of high education at the expense
of only sunk costs. When the psychic payoffs to success or failure are non-negligible —
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in this specification whenever pf = ps> 0.1085 — the high-participation pathway would
also be optimal from the point of view of the child ex-ante, but we have seen that several735
factors could prevent her from attaining that pathway. In this Subsection we assess how
public policy could intervene to improve the child’s cognitive or noncognitive abilities;
in the next Subsection we assess how parents and educators could support the child by
manipulating the exogenous parameters of the model.
The most direct design of intervention would aim to improve the child’s (cognitive)740
ability. This could be effective, because we have established that there generally exists
some threshold level of ability above which high participation would become self sustain-
ing. However we have also established that that threshold ability level swiftly diverges
away from the level accumulated by agents on the low-participation pathway (see Figure
4 or 5), and so if such an intervention is not undertaken very early in the life-course745
it is likely to prove ineffective. Indeed, such an intervention could even prove counter-
productive due to the psychic cost of trying, but failing, to catch up with peers whose
ability is also steadily improving.
Our results therefore suggest that an indirect intervention design could be more effec-
tive. Figure 4 establishes that teaching young children the noncognitive skills of forward-750
planning and self-knowledge could allow them to decide for themselves to participate
fully in educational opportunities. Nevertheless, there will be a critical window (in the
sense of Cunha & Heckman 2007) in which to provide such an intervention, whereafter
non-participation would become the equilibrium strategy of even a sophisticated child
with low prior participation. In such cases our model suggests that the child would need755
to consciously decide to prioritise their future outcomes over their present behavioral pay-
offs if they were to escape the low-participation pathway. Unless the child is successfully
supported to make that decision, no intervention is likely to have a lasting effect on her
participation decisions after it has been removed.
In order to support a child to not only consciously delay their gratification, but also760
to stick by that decision against unfavourable present-period payoffs; long-term one-one
mentoring is likely to be required. However such an intervention would present financial
and logistical challenges. It may therefore be more efficient to intervene with the game,
rather than with the players who fail to achieve within it.
B. Implications for Pedagogical Practice765
Although the model’s environmental parameters are exogenous for the child, it will gen-
erally be possible for parents and teachers to manipulate them. For example: −c could
be made positive by the use of sufficiently ‘fun’ and engaging tasks, or at worst by the
imposition of credible sanctions on the outside option. ps could be increased by agreeing
appropriately challenging goals, and by the judicious use of praise and rewards. −pf770
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could be made less negative, or possibly even positive, by both explicitly teaching and
implicitly modeling that failure is positive: because it shows that you are taking on chal-
lenges and because it generates learning. Finally, the distant positive payoff of dt could
be made more immediate by emphasising the intrinsic value of developing one’s abilities,
and the sophisticated extrinsic value that present learning will render future tasks more775
accessible and therefore more enjoyable. Table 3 maps these specific implications onto
existing pedagogical practices, thereby demonstrating that these implications articulate
the insights of experienced teaching professionals.
[Table 3 about here.]
The implications discussed in this section support the conclusion of Cunha & Heck-780
man (2007) that early intervention is vital if the educational pathway of disadvantaged
children is to be altered. However they also extend that conclusion by establishing that
an intervention which na¨ıvely seeks to improve a child’s cognitive ability is less likely to
succeed than one which focusses on the noncognitive determinants of her daily decisions
to under-invest in educational opportunities. Moreover, we have demonstrated that such785
under-investment could arise as an equilibrium response to initial disadvantage. This
suggests that it may not be the players which require intervention from policy-makers,
but rather the game itself. This subsection suggests how such an intervention could be
undertaken.
VI. Conclusion790
This paper has developed a new model of educational investment which is both tractable
and intuitively plausible. We propose that educational outcomes might be cumulatively
determined by a series of minor participation decisions, rather than pre-determined by an
hypothetical one-shot investment decision. Any such one-shot decision would implicitly
require perfect forward planning, complete self-knowledge, and complete self-control, none795
of which is feasible in this context. We identify the specific effects of limitations in each
of these noncognitive abilities, both analytically and numerically.
We establish that our model of education as a repeated participation game is consistent
with the canonical model, in that it recovers the same solution under normatively optimal
assumptions. However, we also establish that when those assumptions are relaxed to ad-800
mit psychic payoffs for success and failure, a profound path-dependence emerges whereby
small changes in initial conditions could lead to divergent educational pathways. That
result suggests a mechanism for the observed persistence of economic inequality, which
has hitherto lacked a robust theoretical explanation.
By founding aggregate educational investment on incremental participation decisions805
we are also able to provide a theoretical basis for the six key stylized facts of educa-
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tional development identified by Cunha & Heckman (2007). Self-productivity of cogni-
tive ability, dynamic complementarity of external investment with present ability stocks,
and the sensitivity of educational outcomes to early investment are all endogenously
derived within our model. These results explain the empirical finding that early inter-810
vention is vital if initial disadvantage is to be overcome (see, for example: Cunha &
Heckman 2010, Chetty, Hendren & Katz 2015). However our results also go beyond
existing literature in that they are able to inform how, as well as when, to intervene.
A conventional public policy response to educational underinvestment would identify
individuals on a low-participation pathway and support them to improve their educa-815
tional attainment. Our findings suggest that an intervention which directly targets those
individuals’ cognitive ability is likely to be less effective than one which targets their
noncognitive skills of forward-planning and self-knowledge: the latter could achieve a
lasting improvement in those individuals’ participation decision-making, whilst the for-
mer would only raise their educational attainment for a transient period. However, our820
findings also establish that the main challenge for any individual-focussed intervention
is that non-participation could arise as an equilibrium response to earlier disadvantage.
This implies that the causes of ongoing non-participation are likely to be exogenous to
the individual, and so any attempt to intervene should consider targeting that exoge-
nous situation, rather than the individual trapped within it. Since the parameters of825
our model describe tangible aspects of a child’s educational situation, we have identified
specific intervention actions which could enable participation in equilibrium by altering
the educational opportunities provided to disadvantaged children. Our results suggest
that such pedagogical interventions could contribute toward a meaningful reduction in
the persistent economic inequality of modern society.830
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A. Mathematical Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 0: E(Πt(n)) is a strictly increasing function of n
Since we have the simplifying assumption that Πt(n) is well-defined, we may, without
loss of generality, choose the order in which the implied n periods of participation appear
within t−1 prior periods. Let us therefore compare Πt(n) with Πt(m), where m < n < t,835
by assigning the first t−n−1 periods of both participation sequences to non-participation,
and the following m periods to participation. The final n−m periods were therefore either
periods of participation to reach Πt(n), or periods of non-participation to reach Πt(m).
Thus Πt(n) stochastically dominates Πt(m) by the transitivity of stochastic dominance,
hence E(Πt(n)) > E(Πt(m)).840
B. Proof of Proposition 1
In any given period t ≤ T , the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of Figure 1 is a strategy s∗t
that maximizes the agent’s expected utility (2).
The constrained maximization of (2) yields three cases. Firstly, it is possible that
the expected value of participation,
[
dt − c− pf + w(pit,Πt)(ps + pf )
]
could be precisely845
0, in which case all values for the decision variable provide identical expected utility.
However, provided that at least one of the decision parameters is continuously distributed,
this case occurs with probability 0, and so we do not analyse it further. Otherwise, if[
dt − c− pf + w(pit,Πt)(ps + pf )
]
> 0, then the optimal strategy is to set st = 1, and
conversely, if
[
dt − c− pf + w(pit,Πt)(ps + pf )
]
< 0, then the optimal strategy is to set850
st = 0. Thus, with probability 1, the decision problem in period t has a unique equilibrium
response of st ∈ {0, 1}.
For definiteness we may therefore declare, with almost no loss of generality, that
agents will participate in a given educational task if and only if:
[
dt − c− pf + w(pit,Πt)(ps + pf )
]
>0




Finally, note that we assume throughout that ps, pf , c > 0, hence participation is always
optimal if dt > c + p
f , and never optimal if dt + p
s < c, since the subjective success
probability w(pit,Πt) must be bounded within [0, 1]. 855
C. Proof of Proposition 3
For the first two items, note that in period T the participation condition is precisely (5).
Then, by backward induction we will assume that results 1 and 2 hold for all periods
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t > τ , and we will show that they must then hold for period τ . The period τ utility
maximization problem is therefore given by:
max
sτ
Uτ (n) = sτ
[
dτ (n)−c−pf + w(piτ ,Πτ )(ps + pf ) + βδU∗τ+1(n+ 1)− βδU∗τ+1(n)
]
+ βδU∗τ+1(n)
where n is the number of educational tasks thus far attempted, and U∗τ+1(n) is the period
τ+1 value of the maximum payoff that could be achieved throughout periods t > τ , given
prior participation n by that period. (Note that this exists and is well-defined because
of the induction assumption, and because the intersection of finitely many mathemati-860
cally certain events is mathematically certain). The solution to this problem yeilds the
participation condition
w(pit,Πt) > −dt − c− p
f + βδU∗τ+1(n+ 1)− βδU∗τ+1(n)
ps + pf
(6)
with probability 1 provided that at least one of the parameters is continuously distributed.
Thus, by induction, the first two results are proven.
Now consider an agent who has no information regarding pit. We must have that865
w(Πt, pit) is in fact a function of Πt alone. Suppose then that w(Πt) < E(Πt) for some
ability distribution Πt. Then there is some value of dt for which the agent will not
participate under w(Πt), but would if w(Πt) were E(Πt). (6) implies that one such dt is
given by
dt = c+ p
f − w(Πt) + E(Πt)
2
(ps + pf )− βδU∗τ+1(n+ 1) + βδU∗τ+1(n).
However, at this value of dt the expected payoff to participation is
dt − c− pf + E(Πt)(ps + pf ) + βδU∗τ+1(n+ 1)− βδU∗τ+1(n) =
E(Πt)− w(Πt)
2
(ps + pf ) > 0,
and so participation would maximize expected utility. Thus w(Πt) < E(Πt) cannot be870
optimal in expectation. An analogous argument shows that w(Πt) > E(Πt) cannot be an
equilibrium outcome. 
D. Proof of Proposition 2
pf and ps are assumed to be time-invariant, and w(Πt) = E(Πt) in equilibrium by Propo-
sition 3. Therefore to prove the proposition it suffices to show that E(Πt(n)) is a strictly875
increasing function of n, which was shown in Lemma 0. 
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E. Proof of Proposition 4
By the principle of induction it suffices to show that participation in any period t implies
participation in period t+ 1. From the participation condition of the stage game (2) we
have that this will certainly be the case whenever
[
dt+1 − c− pf + w(pit+1(n+ 1),Πt+1(n+ 1)(ps + pf )
] ≥ [dt − c− pf + w(pit(n),Πt(n)(ps + pf )]
for all n, t : n < t. Thus, under commitment and by Proposition 3 we require:
[
dt+1 − c− pf + E(Πt+1)(ps + pf )
]− [dt − c− pf + E(Πt)(ps + pf )] ≥ 0[
E(Πt+1(n+ 1))− E(Πt(n))
]
(ps + pf )− βδT−t[V ′(n+ 1)− δV ′(n)] ≥ 0 ∀n, t : n < t,
where the 2nd line follows from the definition of dt (1). 
F. Proof of Proposition 5
First note that, as T → ∞, we have, by (1) that dK → 0 for any finite K, provided880 [
V (nK + 1)− V (nK)
]
is bounded, sufficient conditions for which are: V (0) = 0, V ′ ≥ 0,
and V (T ) finite.
Next note that a myope maximises his stage game utility function Uk = sk
[−c− pf + w(Πk)(ps + pf )]
(from 2) in all periods k ≤ K.
Since in the first period we have w(Π1) = E(Π1) =
1
2
, by Proposition 3, the utility885
maximization problem yields s1 = 1 if and only if p
s − pf > 2c. Since finite K has
been fixed, we may then apply induction, from k = 1 to k = K, by noting that, given
participation was optimal in period k, participation will remain optimal in period k + 1,
since the only change in the payoff function will be that Πk+1 now stochastically dominates
Πk, hence w(Πk+1)(p
s + pf ) > w(Πk)(p
s + pf ), since w(Πt) = E(Πt), and p
s, pf > 0.890
The converse holds by an analogous argument. 
G. Proof of Lemma 1
First note that, with probability 1, st ∈ {0, 1} ∀ t, by Proposition 3. Next, note that
since ps = pf = 1 for a normatively optimal agent (NOA):13 w(Πt, pit) is irrelevant, and
so the solutions with and without commitment are identical.895
We now characterize the pattern of participation, for a normatively optimal agent
who maximizes the family of utility functions {4}. Suppose for some strategy S with ns
participation periods, there exist φ, t and τ , all integers, such that st = 1 and sτ = 0,
and φ ≤ t < τ . From {4} the expected utility contribution of period t from the point
of view of period φ is Uφt = βδ
t−φ [dt − c− pf + w(pit,Πt)(ps + pf )], which reduces to900
13As an aside, I note that NOA’s biblical namesake also behaved normatively.
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dt − c for NOA.14 From (1) we have that dt = βδT−t+1
[
V (ns)− V (ns − 1)]. The Utility
contribution of period τ is Uτ = 0, and so the total contribution of periods t and τ
is Ut,τ = δ
T−φ+1 [V (ns)− V (ns − 1)] − δt−φc. Consider the deviation from this strategy
wherein st is altered to 0 and sτ is altered to 1. Then, since n
s is unaltered, we would have
U˜t,τ = δ
T−φ+1 [V (ns)− V (ns − 1)]− δτ−φc, which exceeds Ut,τ since τ > t and δ ∈ (0, 1),905
and so S cannot be a Nash Equilibrium strategy. Thus the normatively optimal pattern
of participation under ex-ante commitment is to postpone participation so far as possible.
It remains to determine n∗, the normatively optimal number of periods of task par-
ticipation. Given the above, we need only consider strategies, S, characterized by
T − ns periods of non-participation, followed by ns periods of participation. For an910
interior solution, the foregoing analysis yields that ns is optimal if and only if both:
δn
s
[V (ns)− V (ns − 1)] > c and δns+1 [V (ns + 1)− V (ns)] < c. The assumption that
V ′′(n) ≤ 0 is sufficient to ensure that at most one n∗ satisfies this condition, since δ < 1.
If no n∗ satisfies this condition, then we necessarily have a corner solution, whereby ei-
ther zero participation is optimal — since c > δ [V (1)− V (0)] — or full participation is915
optimal — since c < δT [V (T )− V (T − 1)]. These situations are made compatible with
the proposition by defining V (−1) := −∞, and V (T + 1) := V (T ). Nevertheless, these
situations are also somewhat pathological, in the first case because the returns to primary
education are known to be high (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos 2004), and in the second
because it requires c to become vanishingly small as T becomes large. 920
H. Proof of Proposition 6
For the second result, note first that Proposition 3 implies that w(Πt) = E(Πt), and so
the assumption of evenly-weighted psychic payoffs: E(Π1) =
1
2
and ps = pf , is sufficient
to ensure that the first period utility maximization problem of the naif is identical in value
to that of her NOA counterpart, except that the value of dt will be a smaller positive925
value since β < 1 and V ′(n) > 0. Thus if a naif participates in period 1, then her NOA
counterpart would do so a fortiori.
We now proceed inductively. Suppose that a naif does not participate in period t.
Then in period t+1 the psychic component of her participation payoff−pf+w(Πt)(ps+pf )
will have decreased (or become more negative), since Πt+1 will be stochastically dominated930
by Πt, hence w(Πt+1) < w(Πt) by Proposition 3. The material component of her payoff,
dt − c, will remain below (more negative than) that of her NOA counterpart, since β <
1. Thus, by the principle of induction, we have that the naif will participate only if
her normatively optimal counterpart would do so, up until the naif’s first period of
participation. Thus the naif does not participate until weakly after NOA. Since NOA935
14If t = φ then the factors β should not appear in Uφt , however since β = 1 for NOA this is an irrelevant
detail.
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maximally postpones his participation (Proposition 1), and since the Naif believes that
in all future periods she will act as NOA, we also have the useful result that the naif will
only participate if she expects that she will continue to do so thereafter.
For the third result, note first that the present-period payoffs of the naif are identical
to those of the myope. Thus, in the final period their solutions are also identical. In any940
period τ < T , either τ ≥ T −n∗ or τ < T −n∗.15 In the former case, the naif believes that
she will participate in all periods t > τ , and so the total utility benefit of participation
to the naif exceeds that to the myope by
T∑
t=τ+1
βδt−τ [dt(nτ + t− τ)− c]−
T∑
t=τ+1
βδt−τ [dt(nτ + t− τ − 1)− c] (7)
provided that the naif’s expected future participation wouldn’t reduce under present par-
ticipation. (7) is negative since V ′′(n) < 0 implies that each term in the second summation945
exceeds its corresponding term in the first. If the naif’s optimal future participation has
reduced, then this remains true because: until the first such period of non-participation
the terms of the second sum exceed that of the first; during the first such period of
non-participation the first summand is 0 and so V ′(n) > 0 implies that it is exceeded
by its corresponding term in the second summation; after the fist such period of non-950
participation the terms are identical (and so there will be no further non-participation in
expectation). Thus in all cases the naif’s total utility benefit to participation is strictly
less than that of the myope, hence she is strictly less likely to participate in any period
τ ≥ T − n∗. For periods τ < T − n∗ an identical argument holds, with the summations
in (7) running instead from t = n∗ → T .955
Now for the first result, we make use of the fact that the naif believes they will act
as NOA in all future periods (that is, they will set pf = ps = 0, and β = 1). Thus they
do not appreciate that the ability development implications of their period k choice will
in any way affect their future payoffs. Thus in any period k their only consideration is
to maximise their present-period utility Uk = sk
[




T−k+1[V ′(n + min {n∗, T − k}) by (1), where n is the number of periods of par-
ticipation to date, and n∗ is the normatively optimal number of participation periods.
Unaifk therefore converges to U
myope
k as T → ∞, so Proposition 5 holds for the naif also.

I. Proof of Proposition 7965
To prove the first three results, denote the sophisticate’s optimal strategy (which we know
to be well-defined by Proposition 3) by S. Unless participation is maximally front-loaded,
S must include, at some point, the strategy sequence st = 0, sτ = 1, where τ = t+1. Let S˜
15Where n∗ is the well-defined number of participation periods for NOA, see Proposition 1.
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denote the alternative strategy where participation is swapped between those two periods,
such that st = 1 and sτ = 0. Then, from the point of view of period t
16, the net increase in970
utility due to switching from S to S˜, would be U˜t,τ−Ut,τ =
[
w(Πt, pit)(p




s + pf )− c− pf] since the payoffs in all other periods are identical under
the reordering and the net developmental payoff is unchanged. For β, δ ∈ (0, 1] and
under commitment we have, by Proposition 3, that a switch to earlier participation would
therefore be beneficial if and only if [E(Πt)− βδE(Πτ )] (ps + pf )− (1− βδ)(c+ pf ) > 0.975
Rearranging yields the equivalent condition: E(Πt) − βδE(Πτ ) > (1 − βδ) c+pfps+pf , since
ps, pf > 0. Analogously, the converse of the foregoing argument yields that participation
should optimally be postponed if and only if E(Πt)− βδE(Πτ ) < (1− βδ) c+pfps+pf .
Thus, in the special case that β = δ = 1, the above conditions collapse such that
the participation sequence {0, 1} can never be optimal provided E(Πt) > E(Πτ ). The980
latter is always true, since Πτ is evaluated for a strategy which is identical to that which
gives Πt, save that the agent does not participate in period t, hence we have that Πτ is
stochastically dominated by Πt.
Further, under ex-ante commitment, we have that participation should always be
postponed whenever (1 − βδ) c+pf
ps+pf
≥ 1. This is true, since E(Πt), βδE(Πτ ) ∈ (0, 1),985
whereby their difference is ∈ (−1, 1), and so can never be ≥ 1. Note, however, that
as βδ → 1 this condition would require c
ps
→ ∞, which is infeasible. As βδ → 0 it
becomes sufficient for the direct and opportunity costs to merely exceed the psychic
payoff of success, such that c ≥ ps. (We might also note the special case of NOA, where
postponement is always optimal since ps = pf = 0).990
The proof of the third result is straightforward. V ′(n) > 0 ensures that dt(n) > 0 for




s + pf )− c− pf] ≥ 0. Moreover, the sophisticate knows that, if
she participates in period t, then E(Πt+1) > E(Πt), and so
[
E(Πt+1)(p
s + pf )− c− pf] ≥
0 will be true a fortiori. Thus, inductively, the sophisticate will know that all future pe-995
riod payoffs will be positive if she participates in all future periods. Not participating
in any (current or future) period would therefore reduce payoffs for that period. Impor-
tantly, it would also reduce payoffs for periods thereafter, since then E(Πt+1) < E(Πt),
and that reduction could not be compensated for by increased dt since the final number
of participation periods could only be reduced, and since each participation period con-1000




′(n) > 0. Thus any deviation from
the proposed strategy of full participation would necessarily yield a lower total payoff.
To prove the final result, we compare the stream of future utilities for any given
period×prior-participation pair for naifs and for sophisticates. First note that the present
period payoffs, are identical for both levels of sophistication. Thus, in the final period,1005
each type of agent is equally likely to participate. Next we need attend to periods
16t is the operative period in which the decision between S and S˜ would be finalized,
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wherein the naif participates under commitment. From the proof of Proposition 6 we
have that the naif only participates in any period τ < T if she expects to keep partic-
ipating thereafter. It would therefore suffice to show that the sophisticate’s expected
utility stream from period τ under the constraint of continuous participation thereafter,1010
exceeds that of the naif, since the sophisticate’s constrained utility stream must be at
least as great as her unconstrained utility stream. But, given continuous future par-
ticipation, the difference between the sophisticate’s total expected utility gain due to
participation and that of the naif is
∑T
t=τ+1 βδ
t−τ [E(Πt(n+ t− τ))(ps + pf )− pf] −∑T
t=τ+1 βδ
t−τ [E(Πt(n+ t− τ − 1))(ps + pf )− pf], which is positive since E(Πt(n)) is1015
a strictly increasing function of n by Lemma 0. Next we note that, in any period before
T − n∗ (the period after which the naif expects to participate fully), and constraining
the sophisticate to match the expected future participation of the naif, the comparison
is identical save that the limits of the summations run instead from t = n∗ → T (as per
the proof of Proposition 6.3). Finally, we note that, since the case without commitment1020
is identical to that with commitment except in the current period, and since the cur-
rent period payoffs are identical for sophisticates and for naifs, this result equally applies
without commitment. 
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Figure 2:
Payoff Components for Myopes and for Naifs with Commitment
(A) Periodwise Payoff Components for ps=pf =10.
(B) Periodwise Payoff Components for ps=pf =1.
The conditional Expected Utility payoff for each successive stage game, as given in equation (2), parti-
tioned into the developmental payoff dmyopet or d
naif
t , and the total participation cost c+p
f−E(Πt)(ps+
pf ). Two conditional realizations of the total cost are shown: that for the case of task avoidance in peri-
ods 1, ..., t−1 and that for the case of task participation throughout those periods. Also shown is c, the
constant direct and opportunity cost of participation.
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Figure 3:
The Equilibrium Actions of Sophisticates with Commitment
All possible situations are uniquely identified by a Period× Prior Participation pair. Situations which
induce equilibrium participation only for ps = pf = 10 are shaded in light gray, situations which induce
equilibrium participation only for ps = pf = 1 are shaded in dark gray, and the black region indicates
situations where both parametrizations induce equilibrium participation.
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Figure 4:
Participation Probabilities without Commitment, for ps=pf =5
(A) Sophisticates (B) Naifs
(C) Myopes
All possible situations are uniquely identified
by a Period × Prior Participation pair. For
any such pair, the agent or myope will partici-
pate if and only if their realized probability of
success pit is sufficiently high. The probability
of this occurring is denoted ρ, and illustrated
in these figures.
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Figure 5:
Simulated Ability Development for 9 Myopes
Simulated relative ability development for 9 myopes with initial ability 0.5, pf =ps=5, c=0, and other
parameters as per Table 2. The bar above each panel is shaded to indicate the local participation density.
EDUCATION AS A PARTICIPATION GAME 41
Figure 6:
The Effects of ps, pf , and c on Myope Participation
(A) Percent Participation for ps=pf =5
(B) Percent Participation for c = 1
Gray dots show the simulated participation percentages for each of 200 myopes (for the model without
commitment) at each c or ps = pf , with other parameters as per Table 2. Black Diamonds show the
participation percentage of a myope under periodwise commitment, for each of the above cases.
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Table 1:
The Sophistication Constraints (Noncognitive skill levels) of each Agent Type
Agent Type Characteristics
Sophisticate Perfect forward planning; complete self-knowledge.
Naif Perfect forward planning, but unaware that she will continue to experience
psychic payoffs and present-bias in future periods.
Myope No forward planning — merely acts as if he were maximising the expected
utility of the stage game; self-knowledge irrelevant.
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Table 2:
The Parametric Assumptions for the Model Solved in this Subsection
Parameter Assumption Notes
Number of periods T = 10, 000 Robust to parameter variation.
Initial ability
distribution
Π1 ∼ Beta[2.5, 2.5]
As per Filippin & Paccagnella (2012);
Robust to truncated normal;
Robust to parameter variation.
Πt update magnitude ι = 0.005 Robust to parameter variation.
Participation benefit V (n) = V (T )
[
1− ( 9991000)n] Robust to parameter variation;
Robust to linear benefit accrual.
Maximum participation
benefit
V (T ) = 50, 000 Robust to parameter variation.






Robust to asymmetric values.
Participation cost c = 1 Robust to parameter variation.
Discount rates β = 0.9, δ = 0.999
Reasonable cf. (Benhabib, Bisin & Schotter 2010)
and (Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue 2002);
Robust to parameter variation.
A detailed discussion and robustness checks are provided in the Online Appendix.
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Table 3:
Mapping the Model’s Implications onto Existing Pedagogy
−pf more positive Fostering grit and resilience (e.g. Duckworth et al. 2007).
ps more positive Judicious use of praise (e.g. Hart 2010);
Appropriately challenging goals (e.g. Bandura & Schunk 1981).
−c more positive Tasks should be engaging (e.g. Christenson, Reschly & Wylie 2012);
Effective use of sanctions (e.g. Emmer, Everston & Anderson 1980).
dt more immediate Emphasis on the formative use of assessment (e.g. Black & Wiliam 1998);
Fostering growth mindsets (e.g. Blackwell, Trzesniewski & Dweck 2007).
